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1. Introduction 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (hereafter: UCP Directive)2 aims to combat unfair 
commercial practices in business-to-consumer transactions. Traders who engage in unfairly 
influencing consumers by aggressive or misleading practices may distort consumers’ economic 
choice-making. By countering such practices, the Directive attempts to fortify consumer choice and 
the fair operation of business-to-consumer markets.   
This chapter offers an introduction and analysis of the UCP Directive. First, an outline of the Directive 
is provided (para 2) after which the key elements of the Directive are introduced (paras 3 and 4). 
Then, the relationship between the UCP Directive and other European Directives as well as national 
laws on fair competition and consumer protection is discussed in light of the broad scope and the 
maximum harmonisation principle which underlies the UCP Directive (paras 5 and 6). Further, certain 
aspects of enforcement of the UCP Directive are considered (para 7). After these mostly descriptive 
sections of the chapter, some further attention is devoted to one of the main themes running 
through the UCP Directive, namely the tension between championing self-reliance of ‘average 
consumers’ and offering protection against certain unsavoury practices (para 8). Moreover, in 
conclusion some unresolved issues and matters meriting further research are discussed (para 9). A 
bibliography completes the chapter (para 10). 
 
2. Outline of the Directive 
The UCP Directive  is a general horizontal framework Directive with maximum harmonisation 
character. The Directive aims to combat unfair commercial practices in marketing, sales and after-
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sales activities of traders in business-to-consumer transactions. By doing so, it targets those practices 
that unfairly distort consumers’ choice-making in such transactions.  
The UCP Directive was adopted in 2005 and evolved out of its precursor, the 1984 Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive.3 However, its scope is considerably wider since it does not merely 
cover advertising but all business-to-consumer commercial practices in all sectors of economic 
activity.4 Hence, the UCP Directive is a generic horizontal framework which scope is not limited to 
specific sectors of economic activity or specific elements of economic exchange.5 
The core of the UCP Directive lies in the prohibition of practices contrary to the requirements of 
professional diligence which materially distort or are likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour of the average consumer with regard to a product or service, in particular with regard to 
‘transactional decisions’ (i.e., decisions concerning the conclusion of a contract and decisions to 
exercise existing contractual rights).6 
The concept of ‘practice’ is defined as any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, 
commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with 
the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers.7 Note, however, that not only marketing, 
advertising and sales practices prior to entry into contract are covered but also after-sales conduct 
(e.g., dissuading consumers from exercising their contractual rights).8 Thus, the subject-matter 
covered by the UCP Directive includes the entire pre-contractual, contractual and post-contractual 
decision-making process of consumers. In principle, the scope of the Directive includes any business-
to-consumer contract.9   
Briefly described, the UCP Directive is built up as follows. First, it sets out a general prohibition of 
unfair commercial practices generally (article 5), followed by specific prohibitions of misleading 
actions and omissions (article 6-7) and aggressive practices (article 8-9). Annex I to the Directive 
contains a list of ‘blacklisted’ practices deemed misleading or aggressive per se. Furthermore, the 
Directive contains rules on self-regulatory codes of conduct (article 10) and on enforcement and 
sanctions (article 11-13). The final provisions of the Directive amend the Misleading and Comparative 
                                                          
3 Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising, OJ 1984 L250/17, as 
amended by Directive 97/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending 
Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising to include comparative advertising, OJ 1997 L290/18. 
On how historical background, see J Stuyck, E Terryn and T Van Dyck, 'Confidence through fairness? The new 
Directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market' (2006) 43 Common 
Market L.Rev. 107, 109 ff. 
4
 Cf. H Collins, 'The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive' (2005) ECLR 417, 418.  
5
 Thus, the UCP Directive regime also applies to regulated products such as medicinal products; cf. ECJ 16 July 
2015, Cases C-544/13 and C-545/13 (Apoteket Farmaci).  
6
 According to article 2 (k) UPC Directive, ‘transactional decision’ denotes ‘any decision taken by a consumer 
concerning whether, how and on what terms to purchase, make payment in whole or in part for, retain or 
dispose of a product or to exercise a contractual right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides 
to act or to refrain from acting’.  
7
 Article 2 (d) UCP Directive. 
8
 See Article 3 (1) UCP Directive.  
9
 Indeed, according to ECJ 16 April 2015, Case C-288/13 (Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság / UPC 
Magyarország Kft.), the unfair practice can consist of one single case rather than a multitude of cases. So, even 
a one-off instance of the provision of erroneous information can constitute a practice in the sense of the UCP 
Directive. 
3 
 
Advertising Directive, which is now restricted in application to business-to-business practices of 
misleading and comparative advertising.10 
3. Unfair commercial practices 
The general clause of article 5 UCP Directive prohibits the use of commercial practices which are both 
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and materially distort or are likely to 
materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to a product or a 
service.11 Note that article 5 serves as a ‘safety net’ since there is no further need to test article 5 
when a practice can be categorised as misleading or aggressive for the application of article 6 and 
following.12  
The normative yardstick of ‘professional diligence’ is open-textured. According to article 2 (h) it 
refers to ‘the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to 
exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general 
principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity’.13 The ‘professional diligence’ standard is a 
normative yardstick of care or competence.14 It does not prescribe a requirement of taste and 
decency.15 In article 2 (e) UCP Directive, the notion of ‘material distortion’ is defined as the 
impairment of the ability to make an informed decision, thereby causing the average consumer to 
take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. This notion of causality is not 
factual but hypothetical since it asks what the average consumer, the ‘reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect consumer’16, would have done not what actual consumers 
have done or would have done. Obviously, the yardstick of the average consumer refers to a non-
existent human model. To complicate matters, the Commission has asserted that it is a normative 
instead of a statistical yardstick.17 In my opinion, this is unsatisfactory because it creates a 
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disincentive for courts and enforcers to properly investigate how markets really work and it 
introduces (or continues) the risk that decisions on how average consumers would or would not 
react to commercial practices are mere conjecture and far off the empirical mark.  
 
4. Misleading and aggressive practices 
Misleading practices consist of misleading actions and misleading omissions. According to article 6 
UCP Directive, there are basically three types of misleading actions: 18   
1) giving false, untruthful or deceptive information,  
2) creating confusion with competitors’ products, trademarks, names and distinguishing 
marks, and  
3) non-compliance with firm and verifiable commitments contained in a code of conduct to 
which the trader indicated he was bound.19  
The first and main category of misleading actions comprises acts of giving false, untruthful or 
deceptive information which deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the 
information is factually correct ad thus causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a 
transactional decision that he would otherwise not have taken. The misleading information can 
relate to the product, its existence, nature, characteristics, price, or to other circumstances such as 
trader identity, qualifications or relevant consumer rights. 20  
According to article 7 UCP Directive, an omission is misleading if it omits or discloses in an unclear, 
unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner, material information that the average consumer 
needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is 
likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken 
otherwise.21 Any decision directly related to the decision whether or not to purchase a product is 
covered by the concept of ‘transactional decision’.22  
Failure to identify the commercial intent of the commercial practice is also misleading if this intent is 
not already apparent from the context.23 Article 7 (4) furthermore imposes a positive duty on traders 
to disclose certain information when they make ‘an invitation to purchase’ to a consumer. 24 The 
listed items of information include, e.g., main characteristics of the product, price inclusive of taxes. 
Moreover, article 7 (5) provides that ‘information requirements established by Community law in 
relation to commercial communication’ is to be disclosed as well. A non-exhaustive list of such 
Community rules is laid down in Annex II to the Directive. The result of all this is that non-compliance 
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with these specific (and mostly pre-contractual) information duties is deemed an unfair commercial 
practice.  
Aggressive practices are those which in their factual context, taking account of all features and 
circumstances, by harassment, coercion, use of physical force, or undue influence, significantly 
impair or are likely to significantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct with 
regard to the product and thereby causes him or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision 
that he would otherwise not have taken. The use of psychological pressure such as the exploitation 
of vulnerability or discouraging the average consumers from asserting their rights is also considered 
to constitute an aggressive practice.25 For example, traders who introduce artificial obstacles for 
consumers to terminate their contracts and switch to other traders or to exercise their contractual 
rights may thus commit aggressive practices.26 
Annex I to the Directive consists of a ‘black list’ of practices considered unfair under any 
circumstances.27 The blacklisted practices are deemed unfair in the sense that no further evidence of 
unfairness, misleading or aggressive nature is required. The list covers 23 misleading and 8 aggressive 
practices. For example, deemed misleading is a commercial practice which describes “a product as 
‘gratis’, ‘free’, ‘without charge’ or similar, if the consumer has to pay anything other than the 
unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of 
the item”.28 In Purely Creative, the ECJ was called to construe Annex I, para. 31, according to which a 
commercial practice which creates ‘the false impression that the consumer has already won, will win, 
or will on doing a particular act win, a prize or other equivalent benefit, when in fact either there is 
no prize or other equivalent benefit, or taking any action in relation to claiming the prize or other 
equivalent benefit is subject to the consumer paying money or incurring a cost’ (prize draw and 
lottery scams) is deemed aggressive.  The Court held that in applying this rule, it is irrelevant that the 
cost imposed on the consumer is de minimis compared with the value of the prize. Furthermore, the 
prize draw can even be deemed aggressive if the consumer has a number of methods by which he 
may claim the prize, of which at least one is free of charge, if, according to one or more of the 
proposed methods, the consumer would incur a cost in order to obtain information on the prize or 
how to acquire it.29 
5. Maximum harmonization principle 
The UCP Directive follows the maximum harmonization principle.30 So, national legislation offering 
less or more protection to consumers is in contravention of EU law. As a result, some member states 
were obliged to repeal existing protective measures such as specific price listing regulations while 
others found that national rules specifying the format of certain pre-contractual information 
overstepped the maximum harmonisation boundaries.31  
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The underlying rationale of maximum harmonisation character of the UCP Directive is that this 
guarantees a pan-European level playing field by creating legal certainty and a fair balance between 
traders’ duties and consumers’ rights.32 To a large extent, the matter of maximum harmonisation 
turns on whether the general clauses and the Annex of the UCP Directive may be supplemented by 
national rules which are more concrete in nature.  
However, the generic scope of the Directive is not exceptionally well demarcated.33 The scope is such 
that it may cut through various national legal fields and doctrines, such as laws of ‘market practices’ 
in economic law and contract law doctrines of mistake, misrepresentation, duress, fraud, deceit, and 
even through related areas such as the field of economic torts. Moreover, one can question the 
efficacy of maximum harmonisation through a horizontal Directive which has such a broad-brushed 
sphere of application and whose general clauses of unfairness ultimately need a case-by-case 
application at national level. 34  Therefore, it is important to review the exceptions to the maximum 
harmonisation character.  
Firstly, the relationship between the UCP Directive and sector-specific or product-specific rules is as 
follows. In case of conflict between provisions of the UCP Directive and other Community rules 
regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the latter take precedence (article 3 (4)).35 
For instance, EU regulation 1008/2008 on Air Services sets particular rules on information disclosure 
in the online sales of airline tickets. Because of their more specified nature, these rules take priority 
over the general pre-contractual information duties laid down in the UCP Directive.36 This priority 
also applies in case the specific EU rules are of a minimum harmonization character.  
Secondly, according to article 3 (8) UCP Directive both national and EU rules on establishment or 
authorisation of regulated professions as well as the deontological codes and rules that uphold 
standards of integrity of these professionals, are exempt from maximum harmonisation.  
Thirdly, the UCP Directive is without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the 
validity, formation or effect of a contract (article 3 (2)).37 
Fourthly, in the domain of financial services and immovable property the UCP Directive is of 
minimum harmonisation (Article 3 (9) UCP Directive).  The reasoning for this exception was that the 
complexity and risks surrounding financial products and markets may require more detailed rules 
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and policies at Member State level.38 In its recent evaluation of the UCP Directive, the European 
Commission addresses the question whether article 3 (9) UCP Directive merits repealing.39 The 
Commission concludes that the exceptions to the maximum harmonization principle will be left 
unchanged.40 Therefore, Member States will continue to be allowed to apply more stringent rules on 
commercial practices in the financial services domain.  
Fifthly, rules on ‘the health and safety aspects of products’ are excluded from maximum 
harmonisation (Article 3 (3) UCP Directive).41 So, advertising restrictions concerning medical devices, 
pharmaceuticals et cetera, are left untouched by the UCP Directive. It is not entirely clear whether 
rules on marketing and advertising of gambling services can also be filed under this exception.42  
The sixth and final exception to the maximum harmonisation character of the UCP Directive lies in its 
aim. Since the central aim of the Directive is the protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices, the question is whether national rules which impose more (or more specific) restrictions 
on commercial practices in order to protect other interests than consumer interests are excluded 
from the sphere of application of the Directive. For instance, what if a national legislature bans 
certain practices with a view of the protection of fair competition between competitors or the 
protection of employees? In Pelckmans Turnhout, the ECJ ruled that national provisions pursuing 
objectives not related to consumer protection are outside the scope of the Directive.43   
The restrictions that maximum harmonisation imposes on Member States is most acutely felt in 
relation to the blacklist (Annex I). There, the general clauses on unfair, misleading and aggressive 
practices have been supplemented by a list of specific prohibitions. The ECJ has ruled on numerous 
occasions that the blacklist is exhaustive and that the Directive does not allow categorical 
prohibitions of other practices at national level. The basic idea is that ‘it was essential to overcome 
the specific legal barriers caused by the fragmented regulation of unfair commercial practices, which 
gave rise to cost, complexity and uncertainty for both businesses and consumers’.44 Instead, national 
authorities and courts are only allowed to decide on a case by case basis whether other practices 
than those banned in the blacklist are unfair, misleading or aggressive. On that basis, the ECJ has 
ruled that the following national rules are incompatible with the UCP Directive:  
 
 Rules that generally prohibit combined offers45  
 Rules that generally prohibit practices under which participation in a prize competition or 
lottery is conditional on the purchase of goods46 
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 Rules that generally prohibit sales with bonuses47  
 Rules that general prohibit advertising of upcoming sales in a particular period48 or without 
authorization.49  
Therefore, the Annex is exhaustive and Member States are not allowed to introduce or maintain 
their own list of unfair practices. How this rigid stance is to be reconciled with the scope of 
application and exceptions to the maximum harmonisation principle, is not entirely clear. What if a 
black list is part of the national contract law regime (e.g, ‘a contract following a combined offer is 
voidable’), or aims at protecting both consumer interests and the fair operation of markets 
generally? 
 
6. Relationship with other EU rules of consumer protection 
 
Given the generic scope of the UCP Directive, there are several points of contact between the UCP 
Directive and other EU rules consumer protection. Here, I briefly review these relationships.   
As already mentioned above, the UCP Directive itself formulates a priority rule for other Community 
rules regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices (article 3 (4)). This is relevant where 
the UCP Directive merely formulates vague standards and dedicated EU rules are more specific, e.g., 
where concrete rule-based provisions offer more guidance than the UCP Directive does in terms of 
how traders should behave in their marketing practices.50  Note, however, where such specific EU 
rules do not exist, purely national rules may prove to be in violation of the maximum harmonisation 
character of the UCP Directive.  
As far as information duties under the UCP Directive is concerned, article 7 provides that in the case 
of a so-called ‘invitation to purchase’,51 ‘Information requirements established by Community law in 
relation to commercial communication including advertising or marketing, a non-exhaustive list of 
which is contained in Annex II, shall be regarded as material’. This means that when a trader makes 
an ‘invitation to purchase’, he shall provide the consumer with information, if not already apparent 
from the context, deemed material by Community law in relation to commercial communication. 
Annex II to the UCP Directive refers to information duties laid down in several articles of fourteen 
specific Directives. Thus, the UCP Directive provides that non-compliance with those specific 
information duties constitutes an unfair commercial practice, which brings these duties within the 
national enforcement framework concerning unfair commercial practices. 
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9 
 
A further interesting relationship is the one between the UCP Directive and the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive 93/13.52 In it 2012 Pereničová decision, the ECJ held that unfairness of a certain 
contract practice in the sense of the UCP Directive does not by necessity cause the contract to be 
‘not binding on the consumer’ in the sense of article 6(1) of Directive 93/13.53 Thus, it seems that 
using unfair contract terms in itself is not an unfair commercial practice; courts should fully 
investigate the consequences of such use in light of the specific circumstances.54 
A latest addition to the consumer acquis is the 2011 Consumer Rights Directive (CR Directive).55 In 
several respects, the CR Directive and the UCP Directive overlap. For instance, both Directives lay 
down similar rules on material information that needs to be provided prior to entry into contract.56 
Moreover, the CR Directive supplements the UCP Directive in respect of inertia selling (unsolicited 
deliveries). Such practices are prohibited under both Directives but in addition to the prohibition 
under Article 5(5) and point 29 of Annex I UCP Directive, article 27 CR Directive provides a 
contractual remedy by exempting the consumer from the obligation to provide any consideration for 
such unsolicited supply or provision.57 
7. Enforcement 
The method of enforcement is by and large left to the discretion of Member States. Article 11 UCP 
Directive sets out that Member States shall implement adequate and effective means to combat 
unfair commercial practices in order to enforce compliance, e.g., by means of powers conferred on 
courts or administrative authorities to issue stopping orders, prohibitive injunctions, publication and 
rectification orders, et cetera. It is left to the discretion of Member States to choose the exact form 
of the enforcement mechanisms, as long as it offers recourse to an administrative or judicial 
procedure to those persons and organizations having a legitimate interest, which includes 
competitors.58 According to article 13 UCP Directive, Member States shall also ensure that a system 
for sanctioning unfair commercial practices. This needs to be a system of effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties. 
The implementation techniques vary considerably. For instance, the Member States employ a wide 
range of enforcement methods against a background of diverging enforcement styles and cultures.59 
                                                          
52
 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993 L 095/29. 
53
 ECJ 15 March 2012, C-453/10 (Jana Pereničová, Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ spol. s r. o.). 
54
 Note that the German Supreme Court decided in 2010 that the use of general contract terms affecting 
consumer rights in contravention of compulsory statutory protection constitutes an unfair commercial practice. 
See BGH 31 March 2010, GRUR 2010, 1117. Cf. S Augenhofer, 'Aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen im 
Europäischen Verbraucherrecht' in S Augenhofer (ed) Verbraucherrecht im Umbruch (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 
2012)  21. 
55
 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, OJ 2011 L 304/64. 
56
 Compare for instance article 7 (4) UCP Directive (information in case of ‘invitation to purchase’) and article 5 
and 6 CR Directive (information duties ‘before the consumer is bound’). 
57
 See CR Directive, preamble 60. 
58
 Article 11 (1) UCP Directive. 
59
 On the various approaches in enforcement technique, see F Weber, The Law and Economics of Enforcing 
European Consumer Law - A Comparative Analysis of Package Travel and Misleading Advertising (Markets and 
the Law, Ashgate, Aldershot 2014) ; Wv Boom and M Loos (eds), Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law - 
Securing Compliance in Europe through Private Group Action and Public Authority Intervention (European 
Studies in Private Law, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2007) . 
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In the UK, the Directive was implemented through the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1277).60 These Regulations did not introduce any form of individual 
redress to consumers but merely a system of administrative enforcement orders and criminal law 
sanctions.61 However, recently proposed amendment of the Regulations introduces certain rights for 
consumers, including the right to unwind, the right to a discount and the right to damages.62 In other 
countries, such as Germany, private enforcement by (subsidized) private associations with standing 
to sue for injunction is traditionally the main form of enforcement.63 Again other legal systems have 
an enforcement practice which combines public authority market monitoring with private consumer 
association bargaining, settling and litigating strategies. 
In its recent review, the EC has taken the view that at this stage it is not appropriate to amend the 
UCP Directive substantively. It has, however, voiced concerns over enforcement efforts and 
effectiveness of these efforts in targeting particularly problematic practices.64  
 
8. Protection and self-reliance 
The core of the UCP Directive lies in the information paradigm: by assuring a flow of correct and 
meaningful information, transactional decisions of ‘average consumers’ are undistorted and can 
therefore be assumed to be taken in accordance with consumer preferences.65 From this perspective, 
the UCP Directive is typical of the classical economic framework of EU consumer policy. According to 
the Court’s case law, the ‘reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ 
consumer is expected to seriously attempt collecting and understanding all available information on 
material aspects of a contract.66 So, the ‘average consumer’ is neither credulous nor easily impressed 
or quickly deceived but a self-reliant, confident and pro-active being. In line with the classical 
                                                          
60
 In the UK, administrative enforcement generally was the responsibility of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). 
Enforcement in the financial services domain is the responsibility of the FCA.  See S. 213 Enterprise Act 2002 as 
amended by s. 95 Financial Services Act 2012. Recently, the powers of the OFT were transferred to the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and (mostly) the local Trading Standards authorities. See Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 as amended by the Public Bodies (The Office of Fair Trading 
Transfer of Consumer Advice Scheme Function and Modification of Enforcement Functions) Order 2013. 
61
 McGuffick v Royal Bank of Scotland plc (2009) EWHC 2386 (Comm). Cf. Enterprise Act 2002, Part 8 
(Enforcement of certain consumer legislation).  
62
 See the 2013 Draft Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading (Amendment) Regulations. 
63
 See, e.g., the German model, on which, e.g., D Poelzig, 'Private or public enforcement of the UCP Directive? 
Sanctions and remedies to prevent unfair commercial practices' in W van Boom, A Garde and O Akseli (eds), 
The European Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: Impact, Enforcement Strategies and National Legal 
Systems (Markets and the Law Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2014) ; see also WH van Boom, Efficacious 
Enforcement in Contract and Tort (inaugural lecture EUR) (BJU, The Hague 2006) . Note, however, that even the 
German legal system uses administrative law (cf. the Consumer Protection and Food Safety Authority Act 2002 
(Gesetz über die Errichtung eines Bundesamtes für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit (BVL-Gesetz 
- BVLG)) and criminal sanctions (cf. §16-19 Act against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb; UWG)). 
64
 European Commission 2013. 
65
 The information paradigm is also apparent from the requirement under article 7 (4) UCP Directive to provide 
certain material information prior to contracting. For additional and partially overlapping ‘material information’ 
requirements see article 5 (1) of the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU. Obviously, the UCP Directive is 
also concerned with aggressive commercial practices.  
66
 ECJ 16 July 1998, C-210/96 (Gut Springenheide); ECJ 19 September 2006, C-356/04 (Lidl and Colruyt); cf. ECJ 6 
July 1995, C-470/93, Jur. 1995 p. I-01923 (Mars).  
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economic framework, the UCP Directive is geared towards empowering rather than restraining this 
‘homo economicus’ in its transactional decision-making processes.67 
However, the Directive does not only revolve around ‘average consumers’ since it also refers to 
particular consumers who are vulnerable “to the practice or the underlying product because of their 
mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity".68 Therefore, the UCP Directive oscillates between two 
objectives, namely empowerment of of self-reliant and autonomous consumers (i.e., ‘average’ 
consumers) and protection of ‘vulnerable average consumers’ (whatever that may mean). With 
regard to the first objective, the Directive subscribes to the information paradigm which aims at 
fortifying autonomy and emphasizing individual responsibility. On the other hand, the Directive 
attains the protection of consumers generally and vulnerable consumers in particular against traders 
who exploit their superior knowledge on consumer behaviour and human deficiencies.  
Obviously, the question is what makes consumers vulnerable in connection with commercial 
practices. Given the many human traits and deficiencies of ordinary consumers laid bare by 
psychological and marketing studies, one could argue that all consumers are vulnerable individuals 
and as such deserve some form of protection.69 By contrast, it is sometimes said that consumers 
should take more responsibility for their decisions. For example, in discharging its duties, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), is under a duty to apply a number of principles including the 
principle ‘that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions’ (s. 3B FSMA 2000). This 
sounds stern but what does it actually mean in markets where products are difficult to comprehend 
to begin with, are deliberately made even more complex, and where consumers are short-sighted, 
inert and/or literally or figuratively illiterate? As a consequence, national courts called to apply the 
UCP framework may find that in fact it offers less potential for redress to consumers than national 
doctrines such as mistake, fraud and tort do. Thus, they may be tempted to avoid the straight-jacket 
of maximum harmonisation by resorting to such national private law doctrines. Since the UCP 
Directive is without prejudice to contract law70 – or perhaps even broader: the law of obligations? – 
there may be an implicit policy to turn to national private law remedies in those instances where the 
UCP Directive turns out to be too ‘trader friendly’.71  
 
                                                          
67
 Thus, the UCP Directive can have a damping effect on more protective national legal systems. See Stuyck, 
Terryn and Van Dyck,  134 ff. 
68 Article 5(3). Cf. S Weatherill, 'Who is the 'Average Consumer'?' in S Weatherill and U Bernitz (eds), The 
Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29; New Rules and New Techniques (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2006) 115 ff.; R Incardona and C Poncibò, 'The average consumer, the unfair commercial 
practices directive, and the cognitive revolution' (2007) 30 Journal of Consumer Policy 21, 22 ff. 
69
 For a similar argument, see Stuyck, Terryn and Van Dyck, 121 f. On these human frailties of consumers, see, 
e.g., CP Haugtvedt, PM Herr and FR Kardes (eds), Handbook of Consumer Psychology (Psychology Press, New 
York 2008) ; M Evans, A Jamal and G Foxall, Consumer Behaviour (John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Chichester 2006) . On 
the legal ramifications of these human traits generally, see, e.g,  RB Korobkin and TS Ulen, 'Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics' (2000) 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1051; CR 
Sunstein (ed), Behavioral Law and Economics ((Cambridge Series on Judgment and Decision Making), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  2000) ; RH Thaler and CR Sunstein, Nudge - Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale University Press, New Haven 2008) .  
70
 Article 3 (2) UCP Directive provides that it is ‘without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules 
on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’.  
71
 See Van Boom, Garde and Akseli. 
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9. Unresolved aspects and further research 
 
Given the wide ambit of the Directive and its general horizontal nature, a number of controversial 
aspects become apparent when studying the Directive. In the previous paragraphs some of these 
aspects were already identified.  For instance, paragraph 4 exemplified the problematic issues caused 
by the interplay of the broad general horizontal scope of the UCP Directive and its underlying 
maximum harmonisation principle. Future research would do well to venture further into this area 
and analyse from a comparative perspective the various restrictions set by the UCP Directive to 
national laws of fair competition. This could increase our understanding of the incursions the UCP 
Directive has made in the different countries and the impact it has had on the various legal doctrines.  
The same applies to the embedding – where applicable – of the core concepts of the UCP Directive 
within national systems of private law, notably contract and tort law. Did the UCP Directive have a 
direct or indirect impact on these areas of law? 
Following the analysis in paras 4 to 6, the relationship between the UCP Directive and various specific 
EU rules pertaining to advertising, marketing and sales and after-sales processes could be further 
explored as well. For instance, the ‘division of labour’ between the UCP Directive on the one hand 
and the Consumer Rights Directive and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is far from clear. To what 
extent do these three Directives interact, converge or clash?  
Finally, an issue also worthy of more extensive research was addressed in para 8, namely the limits 
and limitations of the information paradigm as one of the main pillars for EU consumer policies. The 
UCP Directive relies heavily on this paradigm but simultaneously offers specific protection to certain 
categories of vulnerable consumers such as the elderly and children deemed worthy of more 
protection than  the ‘ordinary average consumer’. It seems that the theoretical and empirical 
backbone of the UCP Directive are in need of fortification on this point. Therefore, comprehensive 
reflection on what makes these consumers vulnerable and whether the law can realistically address 
the resulting matters is due.  
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